
I was told once that I was Puck-ish. But what is it to be like Puck?
In Fearless Speech (Foucault and Pearson 2001), Foucault analyses parrhesia in Greek society as expressed in literature of the period. He argues that:
“Parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to the truth, and risks his life because he realises truth-telling as a duty to improve of help other people (as well as himself).” (ibid p18)
Therefore, parrhesia involves:
- a coincidence of the speech act and the belief of the speaker, which sets it apart from, e.g., sophistry;
- an element of personal risk or courage in the face of danger;
- criticism of authority made from the position of inferiority; and
- a moral compulsion or duty to speak when the speaker could choose not to.
It is interesting to note, then, that truth here is not regarded in terms the traditional epistemological problems of correspondence or coherence, but rather as a property of the relations between people: truth can be spoken if the person speaking meets the conditions that are set out above, only the first of which could be considered a matter of ‘individual’ agency.
However, these are not the only considerations, for the parrhesiastes (truth speaker) can be in different kinds of relation with others, and these relations provide the social contract for parrhesia (or parrhesiac contract). For example, Foucault distinguishes between democratic and monarchic parrhesia – the former being the business of one amongst equals and the “authority” in condition (3) is the majority to whom he speaks. The speaker in this context must have standing in order to be heard, and this can be to do with, for example, gender, honour or reputation – and this standing is the basis of the reduction of the risk to the parrhesiastes. Similarly, monarchic parrhesia is the role of the fool, or court jester, who by virtue of a particular social contract with the ruler which is different from the usual court relations, can say what others cannot (Welsford 1935, Otto 2007). There is some contemporary management literature about the role of fools and jesters in organisations which promote these kinds of roles as one of the ways to enhance organisational performance by revealing blind spots or speaking the unspeakable (Riveness 2006; Firth and Leigh 2012).
Finally, Foucault distinguishes between the Socratic and Cynic styles of dialogue which may be taken up by the parrhesiastes – the former aims, gently and through the use of irony, to reveal the interlocutors’ ignorance of their own ignorance. This is characteristic of Plato’s philosophical works and the role of the corporate jester (Riveness, 2006). Cynic dialogue, however, is deliberately provocative, aiming to aggressively confront the interlocuter with a certain kind of reflexivity:
“not to bring the interlocuter to a new truth or to a new level of self-awareness; [but] to lead the interlocuter to internalise this parrhesiastic struggle – the fight within himself against his own faults.” (Foucault and Pearson 2001, p 133)
In other words, the parrhesiastes uses his own reflexivity to encourage his interlocutor to be similarly reflexive.
References:
Firth, D. and Leigh, A. (2012). The Corporate Fool. Cork: BookBaby.
Foucault, M. and Pearson, J. (2001). Fearless speech. Los Angeles, Calif.: Semiotext(e).
Otto, B. (2007). Fools are everywhere. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press.
Riveness, D. (2006). The secret life of the corporate jester. Santa Clara, CA: Jardin Publishing.
Welsford, E. (1935). The fool. London: Faber and Faber.