What is eventalization?

“It means making visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait or an obviousness that imposes itself uniformly on all.”

In Foucault’s Questions of Method article (1978/2000), he defines eventalization as a breach of self evidence – making the taken for granted seem strange and wondering how else things might have been.

He describes his work as “game openings” – invitations to question and analytically, critically and reflexively reflect. I suppose that’s what this blog’s about.

 

Foucault, M. (1978/2000) Questions of Method. In: J.D. Faubion, ed., Power: Essential works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 3. New York: The New Press, p223-238

Hypocrisy and the self

If we can think of intra-psychical conflict – perhaps as parapraxis – as the appearance of a tension between the habitually acknowledged and underacknowledged aspects of self and (and therefore a threat to ontological security), can we think of hypocrisy – perhaps when it is revealed – as the appearance of a tension between the public transcript (discursive material that perpetuates patterns of the dominating social order) and hidden transcript/gossip (discursive matter that threatens the social order if revealed) that presents a threat to the social order?

Both are a kind of transgression that create ambiguity about belonging.

Zoom and the Panopticon

He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power […] he becomes the principle of his own subjection.

Foucault, M. (1975) Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. London: Tavistock

I’ve just been participating in an experiential group for 1.5 hours, with 100 other people. We were using  Zoom which, along with Microsoft Teams, is becoming a (perhaps too) common feature of my social interaction, now that we are all in Covid-19 lockdown.

So, 100 people, cameras on, microphones muted until you wanted to speak about whatever happened to come to mind. There were about 35 people visible per gallery page, with the people who were speaking appearing on the first page. You could scroll to the 2nd and 3rd pages to see everyone else, who of course kept changing place as new people broke into the conversation.

I was new to the group and didn’t say anything at all. Though I appeared for myself on the first gallery page, for everyone else I must have been on page 3… and yet, I felt very self-conscious. Once or twice someone mentioned, almost incidentally, that they had just scrolled through and seen all of the people who weren’t speaking. I wondered if they had seen me, and wondered if anyone else was looking. I had myself scrolled a few times for no other reason than to see everyone else, and I assumed others must have too.

As the group meeting processed, I started to notice how the sense of being looked at seemed to keep coming to mind and that I was paying unusual attention to what I was doing. Trapped in my little Zoom cubicle, seeing everyone else in theirs, I felt strangely like I had to give a good performance of attention; not look at my phone, or look distracted. This started to feel tyrannical and I started to want to turn my camera off, but found myself unprepared to do so as we had been asked to keep our cameras on.

And then I started thinking of the Panopticon.

800px-Panopticon[1]

One of the things the 18-19th century Utilitarian philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, is known  for is his ingenious prison, the panopticon, which  was designed so that every cell in the prison, arranged in a circle, could be observed by a single guard standing in a central tower. Importantly, the prisoners aren’t able to see the guard, so they don’t know if they are being watch at any given time. The notion that they might be, however, leads to behavioural self-regulation to avoid punishment. The prison itself is open to the public so the guards cannot simply do what they wish; they too are subject to the possibility of surveillance and self-regulation.

Foucault uses this a model for talking about normativity in society, and the internalisation of power relations – for him the panopticon is “the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form […] it is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific usage. (Foucault 1975, p.205). The specific usages are for example schools, hospitals, asylums, and factories… which all look a bit like prisons. The behavioural regulation is perhaps through fear… of punishment for lawbreaking, of violence, and of moral outrange amongst peers whose opinions we care about for some or other reason and where there is a possibility of exclusion.

So might Zoom be another mechanism of the potential of pervasive surveillance and therefore social control? No wonder I wanted to turn my camera off.

The shameless society

img_1786

Masaccio’s Expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden in the Brancacci Chapel in the Church of Santa Maria del Carmine, Florence.

I have an idea that social media is changing the fabric of society in a fundamental way, particular in relation to the way we self-regulate as individuals and social groups through experiences of shame.

Before the advent of social media platforms, talking to people whom you didn’t know, or finding people who were like you was hard. The government and media were sources of information and broadly an influential originator of social norms.

Social change took a long time because finding and mobilising others took time, resources and effort. I think it involved changing what social actors felt ashamed about – and things that were unacceptable became acceptable, and the previously unthinkable became not just thinkable but possible.

Social media is an amazing way to connect with others, all over the world. For any given topic a quick twitter search will put you in touch with others who think about things you do. This may be a great force for good: people connecting to fight injustice can convene and organise with almost no resources and big stuff happens. But that force can also be used for ‘ill’. Which is which, of course, is largely a matter of temporal and contextual perspective, and with that kind of plurality comes ambiguity about social norms.

If norms emerge as the patterns in the interactions of social agents, then norms are group processes. If new groups rapidly form around particular ideas, then new norms are emerging at the same time.

And if shame is about breaking social norms, or being excluded from particular groups, is it any wonder that we no longer have a clear idea what we should feel ashamed about?

In that case, a shameless society isn’t necessarily one in which people don’t experience shame, but perhaps one in which it is no longer so easy identify what to feel ashamed about.

Puck-ish?

I was told once that I was Puck-ish. But what is it to be like Puck?

In Fearless Speech (Foucault and Pearson 2001), Foucault analyses parrhesia in Greek society as expressed in literature of the period. He argues that:

“Parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to the truth, and risks his life because he realises truth-telling as a duty to improve of help other people (as well as himself).” (ibid p18)

Therefore, parrhesia involves:

  1. a coincidence of the speech act and the belief of the speaker, which sets it apart from, e.g., sophistry;
  2. an element of personal risk or courage in the face of danger;
  3. criticism of authority made from the position of inferiority; and
  4. a moral compulsion or duty to speak when the speaker could choose not to.

It is interesting to note, then, that truth here is not regarded in terms the traditional epistemological problems of correspondence or coherence, but rather as a property of the relations between people: truth can be spoken if the person speaking meets the conditions that are set out above, only the first of which could be considered a matter of ‘individual’ agency.

However, these are not the only considerations, for the parrhesiastes (truth speaker) can be in different kinds of relation with others, and these relations provide the social contract for parrhesia (or parrhesiac contract). For example, Foucault distinguishes between democratic and monarchic parrhesia – the former being the business of one amongst equals and the “authority” in condition (3) is the majority to whom he speaks. The speaker in this context must have standing in order to be heard, and this can be to do with, for example, gender, honour or reputation – and this standing is the basis of the reduction of the risk to the parrhesiastes. Similarly, monarchic parrhesia is the role of the fool, or court jester, who by virtue of a particular social contract with the ruler which is different from the usual court relations, can say what others cannot (Welsford 1935, Otto 2007). There is some contemporary management literature about the role of fools and jesters in organisations which promote these kinds of roles as one of the ways to enhance organisational performance by revealing blind spots or speaking the unspeakable (Riveness 2006; Firth and Leigh 2012).

Finally, Foucault distinguishes between the Socratic and Cynic styles of dialogue which may be taken up by the parrhesiastes – the former aims, gently and through the use of irony, to reveal the interlocutors’ ignorance of their own ignorance. This is characteristic of Plato’s philosophical works and the role of the corporate jester (Riveness, 2006). Cynic dialogue, however, is deliberately provocative, aiming to aggressively confront the interlocuter with a certain kind of reflexivity:

 “not to bring the interlocuter to a new truth or to a new level of self-awareness; [but] to lead the interlocuter to internalise this parrhesiastic struggle – the fight within himself against his own faults.” (Foucault and Pearson 2001, p 133)

In other words, the parrhesiastes uses his own reflexivity to encourage his interlocutor to be similarly reflexive.

References:

Firth, D. and Leigh, A. (2012). The Corporate Fool. Cork: BookBaby.

Foucault, M. and Pearson, J. (2001). Fearless speech. Los Angeles, Calif.: Semiotext(e).

Otto, B. (2007). Fools are everywhere. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press.

Riveness, D. (2006). The secret life of the corporate jester. Santa Clara, CA: Jardin Publishing.

Welsford, E. (1935). The fool. London: Faber and Faber.

On complex adaptive systems

Eberhard Ross – Starlings

I hear the idea that we are working in complex adaptive systems a lot, often implying that by setting simple rules rather than being prescriptive or controlling, leaders will be somehow more likely to achieve their intended ends.

However, for me, the logic in this thinking is the wrong way around. Let me explain.

If we were to take the classical example of flocking birds, it is remarkable that we can replicate the sky patterns we see on summer evenings by programming digital units to follow 3 “simple” (non-linear) rules (the Boids simulation).

The difference between flocks of birds and organizations, however, is that in the bird-world, no-one is telling the birds to follow those rules – there is no chief bird officer with a goal trying to get the other birds to do something specific. So, we can describe the activity of (real) flocks of birds as CASs because we find that there are simple rules that are being ‘followed’ – BUT the key thing for me is that these rules haven’t been designed. Rather, they have emerged in the interplay of the various appetites we can imagine that real birds have.

The corollary for thinking about organisations is that if we look at the patterns of interaction or behaviour in what we are doing together, while we might find some simple rules that people appear to be operating by – we might call these values or something else that represents the basis of conscious or unconscious meaning and decision making – these are unlikely to have been designed; rather they have emerged in the interplay of our competing needs, both in work and elsewhere.

Moreover, these kinds of rules probably can’t ever be designed or implemented. Partly, this is because the kind of general statements in which these rules might be articulated (so they are simple) are so infinitely interpretable that what they come to mean in practice might be very different from the original intention.

Further, even if we are able to articulate the apparent rules in play, noticing and naming them changes them because, unlike birds or their digital counterparts in the Boids mode, humans have infinite capacity for unpredictable and novel responses to what they encounter, including to the event that they have encountered it before.

So what help does the CAS analogy give us? I think it helps us think about the observable patterns or interaction we notice (‘culture’, or what you will) as a way of taking about contextual social norms. We might then try to start articulating what those seem to be and seeing how these apparent rules evolve, including in response to their being named, or how new rules emerge, in response to interventions or initiatives.

For leaders, this can’t be a ‘do once’ activity – it is an ongoing process that has to change as the patterns of interaction change as humans consciously and unconsciously responsd to what they encounter.